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Abstract: The Internet consistently has new tools for
creating interpersonal connections. Some of these tools
expedite the process of finding new sexual partners outside
of one's current social network. These tools also decrease the
usefulness of social methods for self-protection like
reputation and hasten the spread of sexually transmitted
infections ("STIs").
Sexually non-monogamous people need a way to
make up for the loss of social methods to determine those
who are more likely to have STIs. They could engage in more
monogamy or consistently have safe sex, but these methods
are not working today. Alternatively, a new system could
increase the amount of sexual health data available to
potential partners. Adding this technology to existing
relationship and hookup websites offers an opportunity to
protect people from contracting STIs.1
This article discusses how a sexual health
identification system with strong privacy measures,
combined with existing relationship and hookup websites
would increase sexual safety. Part II of this article describes
the history of safe sex including existing morality-based
solutions to protect people against the transmission of STIs.
Part III describes the problem of internet hookup sites and
identifies existing safe sex websites and improvements they
need. Part IV describes relevant existing technologies in
other fields and the privacy problems therein. Part V
James M. Helmink is a J.D. candidate at The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz
College of Law, Class of 201o. He earned a B.S. in Science, Technology, and International
Affairs from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.
1 Hookup websites are Internet sites with a primary focus of helping members find casual
sexual partners for one night sexual encounters or short sexually focused relationships.
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presents an idea for a successfully implementing a sexual
health identification system that includes an advanced
private key infrastructure and biometric identification linked
to a secure database with recent STI results and reputation
data for potential partners. Part VI describes how the
widespread use of this technology could change the legal
framework for torts involving the spread of STIs and the
legal liability related to this identification system. Finally,
Part VII shows how in comparison to the cost of treatment,
this idea makes financial sense.
I. INTRODUCTION
The exponential rise of sexually transmitted infections ("STIs")2
makes learning about the STI status of potential sexual partners a
critical component of having a long-lasting and healthy sex life.3
According to the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), in 2008, there
were over 45 million total cases of herpes,4 1,210,523 new cases of
chlamydia, 336,742 new cases of gonorrhea, over 46,000 total cases of
syphilis, 5 and over 56,000 new HIV infections in the United States
alone. 6 In addition, the Journal of the American Medical Association
("JAMA") estimates that half of all American women have the human
papillomavirus.7
2 Some medical professionals refer to Sexually Transmitted Infections as Sexually
Transmitted Diseases; this article refers to them as STIs although in this article it is
interchangeable with STDs.
3One In Four Teenage Girls in U.S. Has Sexually Transmitted Disease, CDC Study Shows,
SCIENCEDAILY.COM, March 12, 2008,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2oo8/o3/o8o312o84645.htm.
4 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Genital Herpes - CDC Fact Sheet, Jan. 4,
2008, http://www.cdc.gov/std/herpes/STDFact-herpes.htm.
5 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Sexually Transmitted Disease Surveillance
2oo8, 1-3, 31-33 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/std/statso8/surv2oo8-
Complete.pdf.
6 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, HIVIncidence, Sep. 11, 20o8,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/incidence.htm.
7 Elizabeth Cohen, Rising STD rates sparks online dating sites, CNN.CoM, March 12, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/conditions/o2/27/std.internet/index.html.
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STI transmissions are increasing after a decline during the 198o's
and early 1990's.8 Some believe this resurgence is due to better
treatments for the diseases; others believe that the Internet may be a
key factor behind this rise.9 Research connecting the Internet to STI
transmission is still limited. However, a JAMA study shows that
Internet sex seekers "reported more previous ST[I]s; more partners;
more anal sex ... and [more] partners known to be HIV positive than
those not seeking sex via the Internet."1o A 2006 CDC study expands
on this and shows that compared with men who have sex with men
who meet offline initially; those who meet online initially are less
likely to practice safe sex.,' While online sex seekers use protection
less often, websites such as AdultFriendFinder.com and Manhunt.net
are making it easier to have sex with new, previously unknown
partners. 12 The proliferation of places to find sex online is also leading
to a rapid rise in sex addiction.13
The expansion of easily accessible casual sex does not need to
mean that STI transmission must also rise. When used properly,
condoms have over a 99% efficacy rate, but condoms may slip or break
up to 12% of the time.4 Condom slippage and breakage is most
common among the highest risk communities,15 which means that a
strategy encouraging condom use alone will not solve the problem.
8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, STD Increases among Gay and Bisexual
Men Reported at National Conference, Dec. 5, 2000, Updated June 1, 2003,
http://www.cdc.gov/stdconference/20oo/media/stdgay2ooo.htm.
9 Id.
'0 Mary McFarlane, Sheana S. Bull & Cornelis A. Rietmeijer, The Internet as a Newly
Emerging Risk Environment for Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 284 JAMA, 443, 443-446
(2ooo), available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/284/4/443.
1 Adrian Liau et al., Meta-analytic examination of online sex seeking and sexual risk
behavior among men who have sex with men, 33 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES, 576-
84 (Sept. 2006).
12 See www.adultfriendfinder.com, www.manhunt.net.
13 Internet-led increase in male sex addiction, MEN'S HEALTH FORUM, Jan. 21, 2008,
http://www.menshealthforum.org.uk/userpagel.cftn?item-id=2333.
14 Family Health International, Breakage and Slippage of Male Condoms: What Do We
Know? 2009, http://www.fhi.org/en/RH/Pubs/factsheets/breakslip.htm.
'5 William R. Grady & Koray Tanfer, Condom breakage and slippage among men in the
United States, 26 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, 107-12 (May-June 1994).
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Relying on new sexual partners to discuss each other's STI status is
also ineffective because it relies on trusting a potential partners' word
about their status. Their word is only useful if people get STI tests
frequently and are not afraid to ask or to disclose their own status. 6
This is just one reason why, in an age with more semi-anonymous,
causal sex, a STI identification and verification system will be a critical
component of sexual health that other traditional safe sex techniques
cannot provide.
II. STI HISTORY AND THE FAILURE OF SUSTAINED REDUCTION
STIs are not a new problem. Syphilis was common in Sweden as
early as 1497.17 Before penicillin, syphilis and gonorrhea were
widespread STIs.18 The issue gained some public attention in the
United States during World War I when many U.S. soldiers became
sick from these diseases.19 The military had varying programs to
address these issues ranging from isolation, to providing alternative
activities to alcohol and sex.20
Like soldiers, men who had sex with men also had a high rate of
STIs because the biology of male homosexual sex makes it easier to
spread infections.21 This was in addition to a culture of casual sex,
highlighted by the popularity of bathhouses in the 196o's and 1970's,
16 Danielle C. Newton & Marita P. McCabe, Sexually Transmitted Infections: Impact on
Individuals and Their Relationships, 13 Journal of Health Psychology, 864-869 (2008).
17 Stig Cronberg, The Rise and Fall of Sexually Transmitted diseases in Sweden, 69
Genitourin Med., 184-6 (June 1993), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/833531o.
18 Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United
States since 188o. Expanded ed. New York: Oxford University Press (1987), available at
http://www.faqs.org/childhood/Th-W/Venereal-Disease.html.
19 KENNETH H. MAYER & HANK PIZER, THE AIDS PANDEMIC: IMPACT ON SCIENCE AND
SOCIETY, 112-113 (2005), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=fSui9GabxrUCC&lpg=PT11&ots=dFMqacchAx&dq=han
k%2opizer%2othe%2oaids%2opandemic&pg=PT134#v=onepage&q=world%2oWar&f=fa
Ise.
20 Id.
21 Different HIV Rates Among Gay Men and Straight People Not Fully Explained by
Sexual Behavior, SCIENCE DAILY, Sept. 14, 2007,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/o9/o7o91313293o.htm.
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where it was common to have unsafe sex with multiple partners. 22
This biological disadvantage paired with unsafe sex was devastating to
the homosexual community when HIV came to the United States.23
After the HIV epidemic struck in the early 198o's, safe-sex
techniques became much more widely practiced including:
abstinence, condom use, reducing the number of sexual partners, and
treatment after an exposure to an STI. 24 Then, during the mid-199o's,
more effective medications led to a decline in HIV related deaths.25
This decline may explain the recent resurgence in unsafe sex and
increase in transmission of HIV,2 6 because in the early phase of the
HIV epidemic, those in the highest risk communities frequently saw
friends die from HIV.2 7 Whereas today, fewer trademark signs of the
disease and longer life spans have made the dangers of HIV less
visible.28
22 Richard Coliss, Bette Midler Takes Vegas, Leaves Bathhouse, TIME, Feb. 29, 2008,
available at http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/o,8599,1718624,o0.html.
23 The discussion of HIV in this paper is meant to include those HIV cases that result in
AIDS, HIV is used instead of HIV/AIDS for ease of reading. This application is also useful
for other STDs as well. The application of the system will focus on how it relates to HIV,
but is equally applicable to all STIs for which a person can receive a test.
24 The origin of AIDS and HIV and the first cases of AIDS, AVERT, Dec. 23, 2009,
http://www.avert.org/origin-aids-hiv.htm.
25 Study: HIVMortality Rates Continue to Drop as Treatments Improve, July 1, 2008,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/science/uly-deco8/hivmortality o7-ol.html;
Michael Carter, Safer sex fatigue and HAART optimism explain rise in US bareback sex,
March 22, 2002, http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/C5F449B-BE3C-4C9E-BF97-
2CECDFC5815E.asp.
26 Maxine Frith, High-risk sex lives: HIV on the rise again, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 25,
2006, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-
news/highrisk-sex-lives-hiv-on-the-rise-again-425714.html.
27 Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Town hallfocuses on L.A.'s battle with HIV/AIDS, LA Times,
Oct. 16, 2009, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-aids-studyl6-
2009oct16,o,809470.story?page=2.
28 B.R. Simon Rosser, William West & Richard Weinmeyere, Are Gay Communities Dying
or Just in Transition? Results from an International Consultation Examining Structural
Change in Gay Communities, 20 AIDS Care, 588-595 (May 2oo8), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2562784/; US AIDS deaths decreasing,
PUBLIC AGENDA, April 2008, http://www.publicagenda.org/charts/us-aids-deaths-
decreasing.
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B. MORALITY BASED STI REDUCTION EFFORTS HAVE BEEN
INEFFECTIVE
No matter what the scientific studies say, there remains a
widespread morality-based discontent with any policy to increase safe
sex. Many believe that abstinence until marriage and monogamy
thereafter is the only choice.29 Abstinence has long been the policy of
many churches and was the policy of the Bush Administration.30 Yet,
its failure is evident as the United States has the highest teen
pregnancy rate of any developed country.31
Some have proposed gay marriage bans as a way to decrease HIV
transmission.32 This approach has proven ineffective, as at least one
study has tied gay marriage bans in a state to an increased risk of
contracting HIV.33 The marginalization of the gay community only
increases reliance of many gays upon the internet and anonymous
partners, which consequently increases the levels of HIV
transmission.34
There are several other examples of ineffective morality-based
policies to stem the spread of STIs. One is the Catholic Church's anti-
condom policy.35 Another is laws that intend to decrease HIV
transmission, like a law in Georgia that made it a felony to engage in
sexual behavior without disclosing one's status if someone is
29 See Ted McDonough, Birds, Bees and STDs, SALT LAKE CITY WEEKLY, June 17, 2009,
available at http://www.cityweekly.net/utah/article-8277-birds-bees-and-stds.html.
30 Sharon Jayson, Abstinence Message Goes Beyond Teens, USA TODAY, Oct. 31, 2006,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2oo6-1o-3o-abstinence-
messagex.htm.
3'Teen Pregnancy Rates in the USA, Nov. 18, 2009,
http://www.livestrong.com/article/125o4-teen-pregnancy-rates-usa.
32 Gay Marriage Bans Linked to Rise in HIV Rate, SCIENEDAILY.COM, June 7, 2009,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/o6/ogo6o5171435.htm.
33 Id.
34 Rashmi Gangamma et al., Comparison of HIV Risks among Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and
Heterosexual Homeless Youth, 37 J Youth Adolesc. 456-464 (2oo8), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC244372o.
35AFP, Pope Benedict visits Africa; reaffirms anti-condom policy, March 17, 2009,
http://www.france24.com/en/2009o317-pope-benedit-kicks-off-african-mission-
cameroon-angola-tour.
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knowingly HIV positive.36 Yet, this law does not have the same
penalty if a person is not aware of his or her HIV status and later
discovers that he or she infected another person.37 This results in an
incentive to avoid testing and may actually cause HIV transmission
rates to rise. Another policy is not vaccinating children against certain
STIs because some believe that vaccination may encourage premarital
and unsafe sexual behavior.38 The failure of these morality-based
solutions to stop the spread of HIV further stresses the need for a
better system to help people prevent unnecessary risks of HIV
transmission.
III. THE INTERNET'S ROLE IN STI TRANSMISSION
A. INTERNET HOOKUPS ARE RISKY AND POPULAR
Hookup sites are some of the most visited on the Internet. With
about 28 million visitors a month, Adultfriendfinder.com is one of the
top 100 visited websites in English on the Internet.39 In comparison,
cnn.com has around 26 million.4O Catering to the gay community,
Adam4adam.com and manhunt.net each have over 400,000 unique
visitors a month and gay.com has over 828,000.41
The level of membership on these sites has already changed how
first sexual partners are found. A study in England showed that 61%
36 Sciencedaily.com, supra note 32.
37 Id.
38Danielle Kim, FDA approves HPV vaccine despite conservative protest, THE PALY VOICE,
Nov. 13, 2006, http://voice.paly.net/view-story.php?id=4717; Rob Stein, Debate Rages on
Use of Cervical Cancer Vaccine, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 31, 2005, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/o/31/MNG2LFGJF1.DTL.
39 Alexa, adultfriendfinder.com,
http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic -details/adultfriendfinder.com?compare-sites
=&q=&range=6m&size=medium&y=t (last visited April 8, 2010); Quantcast,
adultfriendfinder.com, http://www.quantcast.com/adultfriendfinder.com (last visited
April 8, 2010).
40 Quantcast, cnn.com, http://www.quantcast.com/cnn.com (last visited April 8, 2010).
4'Quantcast, adam4adam.com, http://www.quantcast.com/adam4adam.com (last visited
April 8, 2010); Quantcast, manhunt.net, http://www.quantcast.com/manhunt.net (last
visited April 8, 2010); Quantcast, gay.com, http://www.quantcast.com/gay.com (last
visited April 8, 2010).
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of gay men find their first sexual partner online, and sociologists
believe the same is probably true in America.42 Meeting sexual
partners online is increasingly popular among heterosexuals as well.
A 2000 study showed that of heterosexuals who met a sex partner
online, they met an average of seven sexual partners that way in the
past year alone.43
While there is an increase in meeting sexual partners online,
infrequent HIV testing makes the problem of trust more prevalent.44
A European Journal of Public Health study in England showed that
25% of men who had sex with men were telling their partners that
they were HIV negative, without ever being tested.45 An American
Journal of Public Health study in the United States showed that
among HIV-positive gay men, 42% had unprotected sex without
telling their partner of their status, and the majority of these
experiences were with non-exclusive partners.46
Deception may be even more prevalent as many sites like
manhunt.net provide a location for an unverified listing of one's HIV
status. The ability to filter results by HIV status provides an incentive
to lie about one's status in order to remain in the search results. A
related study by Gene Robinson of the University of California at Los
Angeles showed how race dramatically affects the amount of contacts
42 Michael Joseph Gross, Has Manhunt Destroyed Gay Culture? Out,
http://www.out.com/detail.asp?id=24005 (last visited April 8, 2010).
43 D. Hollander, Among young adults, use of the internet to find sexual partners is rising
- Digests, 34 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 318-19 (Nov.-Dec.
2002), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ournals/34317o2.pdf.
44 D. Hollander, Frequency of HI V testing is suboptimal among some men who are high at
risk, 38 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 170-71, Sep. 1, 2006,
available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Frequency+of+HIV+testing+is+suboptimal+ among+some
+men+who+are+at+high+...-ao152179182.
45 Anthony Nardone, James S. Frankis, Julie P. Dodds, Paul N. Flowers, Danielle E. Mercey
& Graham J. Hart, A Comparison of high-risk sexual behaviour and HIV testing amongst
a bar-going sample of homosexual men in London and Ediburgh, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL
OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 185-189 (2001), available at
http://eurpub.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/11/2/185.pdf.
46 D.H. Ciccarone, D.E. Kanouse & R.L. Collins, Sex without disclosure of positive HIV
serostatus in a U.S. probability sample of persons receiving medical care for HIV
infection, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, June 2003, at 949-954, available at
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/cgi/content/full/93/6/949.
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on a hookup website for a person.47 This decrease in contacts may
also occur for those who list a HIV-positive status.
Unverified HIV listings in profiles may also increase racially
discriminatory searching because of the substantially higher incidence
of HIV in the black community. Blacks have 47% of the HIV
infections in America even though they are only 13% of the
population.48 Reliable HIV result verification may decrease the
stereotyping that is the result of this imbalance.
Incentives to lie about one's history may be especially strong
among certain harder to identify communities. One such community
is former prisoners because they account for 25% of HIV infected
Americans.49 Another such community are "straight" males who have
sex with women, but also with men. One study shows that while these
men might be using protection when they have sex with other men,
they are up to three times as likely to then have unprotected sex with a
female.5o This can greatly increase the risks for the women who have
sex with these men, as the men are likely to withhold their full sexual
history.51 These examples of communities with incentives to cover
important parts of a person's relevant sexual history, demonstrate the
need for a HIV identification and verification system.
47 Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic Preferences, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2787, 2809-2819, available at
http://law2.fordham.edu/publications/articles/50oflspubl3ol2.pdf.
48 Centers for Disease Control, CDC Basic Statistics, Feb. 26, 2009,
http://www.cdc.gov/HIV/topics/surveillance/basic.htm#aidscases; Condoms urged in
prisons to curb AIDS, MSNBC, Nov. 16, 2oo6, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/157538o3.
49 Paul Sanchez, Center for Health Justice, AB 1334: Inmate and Community Public
Health and Safety Act, 8,
http://www.bienestar.org/Leg%2oBriefing%2oDocuments/AB1334%2oCondoms%2oin%
2oPrisions.pdf (last visited April 8, 2010).
5OCheryl Wold, George R. Seage III, William R. Lenderking, Kenneth Mayer, Bin Cai,
Timothy Heeren & Robert Goldstein, Unsafe Sex in Men who have Sex with Both Men and
Women, 17 JOURNAL OF ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES, 361-367 (April 1,
1998), available at
http://journals.lww.com/jaids/Fulltext/1998/o4oo/UnsafeSex-inMenWhoHave_S
exWith BothMenand.w.aspx; see also I-Ching Ng, Helping the Hidden Community
of HIV, TIME, Aug 19, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/o,8599,1833962,oo.html.
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B. SITES AVAILABLE TODAY MUST Do BETTER
A handful of start-up websites have attempted to address the need
for HIV verification. However, none of the major dating websites have
adopted these safer sex technologies. Checktonight.com, which has
since become defunct, was a personal ad site that loaded negative HIV
test results sent from doctors into a database for their members.52
The site only displayed users with negative results and the site
removed HIV positive users to protect their privacy.53 This caused a
problem because it excluded those who tested HIV positive from the
system. Therefore, if people saw a profile and it suddenly
disappeared, someone might just have deleted it, but another user
could assume that person was HIV positive. Thus, the system was
suboptimal.
Safesexpassport.com uses a more secure method for HIV
verification. A user purchases a card and sets a unique security code,
they are tested, and then the results are loaded into a database.54
Next, to check the results, a person gives their card to a potential
partner who enters the ID number from the front of the card, and the
person who gave the card tells the potential sexual partner their
personal password.55 At this point, the system tells the person the first
three digits of a previously registered photo ID and the person can
check the other person's photo ID to verify the identity.56 Finally,
every six months the card no longer works until someone gets a new
test.57
The Safe Sex Passport is a promising approach, but has several
drawbacks. First, the ID system uses a numeric password to unlock
the results. This can allow for replication of results until the password
s2 The New Frontier of Social Networking (NBC4 television broadcast March 8, 2007),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Hrgalhysyo&feature=channel-page;
Website verifies STD-free sex partners, CANADA.COM, May 20, 2008,
http://www.canada.com/topics/bodyandhealth/story.html?id=c1b64045-de25-47cf-ab83-
dc84o356o93c.
53 Id.
54 SSP BioAnalytics, How the Safe Sex Passport System Works,
http://www.safesexpassport.com/pr/prhowworks.htm (last visited April 8, 2010).
55 Id.
56 Id.
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is changed. For instance, someone could memorize the identifying
information of a person that they shared results with, and then access
that later to share those results with unintended viewers. A more
secure system would constantly change this variable so that the results
would be viewable one time only and could not be retrieved again
using the same password, but this would be complicated to use, and
may lead to people not using the system. An analogy would be
instances in which individuals still have sex even if they forgot a
condom.58 A solution to this problem would be to use biometric data,
so that people could not swap cards with someone they resemble and
it would be easier to use.
A second drawback is for users who want anonymity. They would
not use this system because of the need to get one of these cards with
their photograph on it. When an individual places the card in his or
her wallet, for example, it could raise suspicions from a partner. The
ideal system would have a better option for anonymity, but could still
identify people accurately.
IV. EXISTING IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS AND SOLUTIONS USING THEM
A. SYSTEMS TO IDENTIFY THE PERSON DIRECTLY
Several countries have implemented identification systems that
are instructive for the design of an STI verification system. A method
of verifying participants' identities could be similar to the system for
submitting identification documents and photos used for passports.59
Although the passport process is secure, it is still vulnerable to fraud.
For example, a recent Homeland Security study demonstrated the
threat of fraud when the Department tested its system and was able to
secure genuine U.S. Passports by submitting forged documents. 6°
58 Botswana: A Risky Combination ofAlcohol and Sex, PLUSNEWS.COM, Nov. 5, 2009,
http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=86899.
59 Passports require the attachment of two photographs, primary evidence of U.S.
Citizenship and primary identification. U.S. Dep't. of State, How to Apply in Person,
http://travel.state.gov/passport/get/first/first_83o.htm (last visited April 8, 2010).
60 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,BORDER SECURITY: SECURITY OF NEW PASSPORTS AND
VISAS ENHANCED, BUT MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE TO PREVENT THEIR FRAUDULENT USE,
GAO-oi-ioo6, July 31, 2007, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1oo6;
National Terror Alert, Homeland Security - Study Finds Serious Vulnerabilities in U.S.
Passport Process, March 16, 2009,
http://www.nationalterroralert.com/updates/2009/o3/16/homeland-security-study-
finds-serious-vulnerabilities-in-us-passport-process.
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Therefore, implementing a process like passport issuance will not
guarantee authenticity. In addition, the cost of a passport, currently
available at $100, is cost-prohibitive for the most at risk populations.61
A stricter system, US-VISIT, uses finger scans and digital photos
to track foreign nationals visiting the U.S.62 A similar system to US-
VISIT could meet the needs of an STI verification system. Applicants
could submit photos and use a fingerprint reader on a smart phone. In
order to prove the correct identity, the system could display a person's
picture in addition to requiring that person's fingerprint before
releasing the result. The system would only make this information
available for a short enough period to verify that the result belongs to
a certain person.
Digital signatures are another type of identification technology
that could be useful. Digital signatures use asymmetric cryptology,
meaning the use of two separate keys. 63 A type of asymmetric
cryptology is public key infrastructure ("PKI"), which is a system that
makes one of the keys known publicly.64 The next step is interaction
with a certification authority, which is a trusted vender that
distributes and verifies the legitimacy of the keys.65 The sender has a
private key known only to him to encrypt the message, and the
recipient has a related public key to decrypt the message and verify
whom it is from and that it is unaltered.66 The certification authority
then tells the recipient which public key to use to decode the
message. 67 It is computationally infeasible to determine the private
key from the public key and this makes public key technology very
61 U.S. Dep't. of State, Passport Fees,
http://travel.state.gov/passport/get/fees/fees-837.html (last visited April 8, 2010).
62 U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, US-VISIT What to Expect When Visiting the United
States, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/editorial-o525.shtm.
63Tech-FAQ, What are Symmetric and Asymmetric Ciphers? http://www.tech-
faq.com/symmetric-asymmetric.shtml (last visited April 8, 2010).
64Oracle, The Public Key Infrastructure Approach to security,
http://download.oracle.com/docs/cd/B14117_ol/network.iol/blo777/pki.htm (last
visited April 8, 2010).
65d.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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secure. 68 Then, the certificate authority must verify the identities. 69
Upon verification of the person's identity, PKI makes it very easy to
determine the individual who sent the message. While it is safe to
trust the credentials within the PKI system, trusting the proper
establishment of identities is still a vulnerability of the system.70
These systems are helpful for those who wish to identify themselves
directly, but may not solve the problems for those who still wish to
have anonymous sexual encounters.71
B. SYSTEMS TO IDENTIFY ANONYMOUSLY
Identification systems can also exist with strong identities that are
also anonymous.72 Digital cash is one such tool that allows people to
conduct transactions anonymously, but also ensure authenticity.73
Currently, these systems are still susceptible to fraud because it is
possible to hack into the system and alter the data regarding how
much cash there is on the cards.74 Even with these limitations, the
systems are reliable enough that Hong Kong and Singapore both use
active Digital Cash systems for their public transit systems.7 5 While
68 Stephen E. Blythe, Bulgaria's Electronic Document and Electronic Signature Law:
Enhancing E-Commerce with Secure Cyber Transactions, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 361, 369 (Spring 20o8).
69 Id. at 370-371.
70 Id. at 371-372.
7' See R.A. Roffman, Continuing Unsafe Sex: Assessing the Need for AIDS Prevention
Counseling, 105 PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS, 202, 203 (March-April 199o), available at
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=158oo6o.
72 Carsten Rudolph, Covert Identity Information in Direct Anonymous Attestation, NEW
APPROACHES FOR SECURITY, PRIVACY AND TRUST IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS, 443, 443-448
(2007), available at
http://www.springerlink.com/content/a885j817282p6577/fulltext.pdf?page=l.
73 Webopedia Computer Dictionary, What is Digital Cash? Oct. 21, 2008,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/digitalcash.html.
74 Brad Pufer, Digital Cash, Aug. 2002,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/moolah/digitalcash.html.
75 See J. Christopher Westland, Mandy Kwok, Josephine Shu, Terence Kwok & Henry Ho,
Electronic Cash in Hong Kong, 7 ELECTRONIC MARKETS No.2, 1997, 3, 3-6, available at
http://www.electronicmarkets.org/issues/volume-7/volume-7-issue-2/v7n2 westo.pdf.
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the concept would not directly correlate to STI verification, a tool like
this to verify the authenticity of anonymous information forms the
bedrock for solving this problem.
Similar to digital cash, South Africa gives a smart card to medical
patients.76 This card stores critical data for HIV health benefits that
can only be unlocked with a fingerprint scan.77 The fingerprint record
is stored only on the card and not in a central database. 78 This system
would be useful in a STI verification system for those who oppose a
central authority maintaining their health information. As long as a
private key encoded the result, known only to the trusted testing
centers, the system would be able to identify fraudulent manipulation
of the results. In this way, people could trust that the holder of a
certain smart card had a certain status, while a central database would
not contain any of the results, it would only maintain the private keys.
Systems like digital cash or South Africa's HIV benefits system
could prevent STIs. For example, patrons of a sex club could get a
rapid STI test and be given a card that is valid for a single visit to the
club. One-time use can work because the goal is not to link to a
specific person outside of the closed environment, but only to identify
someone for several hours during one visit. A more secure
implementation of this would change the encryption algorithm once
every 24 hours, thereby making the card unreadable on future visits.
The cards should also link to a certain person for that visit so that
returning the card is necessary upon exit from the club in order to
limit fraudulent misrepresentation. Health departments could require
sex clubs to use this system and pay for it as part of the entry fee to
such facilities. Using this system would ensure that the only people
who would retain the information about another person's status are
those whom that person has chosen to release the information to
during that visit. Even if they tried to share that information without
permission, they would lack proof that they are telling the truth
because they would have no documentation. This is a better solution
than just closing sex clubs as doing so would likely drive the
76 USAID, Application of SmartCard/Biometrics Technology for HIV/AIDS Anti-
Retroviral Therapy in South Africa, March 9, 2005, available at
http://www.africacncl.org/hiv-aids/initiative-activities/ict-initiative/marcho5-presenta
tions/paneh/JSIDELIVER panelh.pdf.
77 Id.
78 id.
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anonymous sex scene further underground making it harder to reach
participants and reduce the spread of HIV.79
V. ELEMENTS OF A SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
A. IDENTIFICATION AND COST
A critical component is creating a method to identify, positively
and securely, an individual with their test results. While identification
does not need to occur by name, a pseudonym would be sufficient, it is
critical that verification of their identity is reliable. The ideal
identification system would use a PKI system as described above in
order to securely and accurately link a person with their test results.
Biometrics presents a good solution because it provides
identification systems using marks that are unique to each person.
One problem is that biometric identification systems are not yet
effective for all subpopulations, which can lead to many false positives
and negatives.8°  Fingerprints also have some vulnerability.
Specifically, fingerprints change over time due to growth or
occupation. For example, the fingerprints of young people may
change with age and some occupations such as bricklayers cause
fingerprints to change. 81 In order to reduce the concerns over these
implementations, a combination of biometric and personal
information is best. The National Academy of Sciences suggests a
good baseline for selection of an authentication identifier: it must be
unique to the system; not widely used; not be sensitive or revealing;
require little or no physical contact; be obviously collected; and not
relate to communication activities. 82
Biometrics alone, however, may not be necessary. Another
method to determine the proper level of identification needed in the
PKI system would be to look at other systems that need identity
79 Daniel Mello Faissol, et. al., Role of Bathhouses and Sex Clubs in HIVandSTD
Transmission: Findings from a Mathematical Model, May 11, 2006,
http://cdc.confex.com/cdc/std2oo6/techprogram/Pllll5.HTM.
8o Id. at 23.
81 Id.
82 STEPHEN T. KENT & LYNETrE I. MILLET, WHO GOES THERE?: AUTHENTICATION THROUGH
THE LENS OF Privacy 188 (2003), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=lo656.
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verification like Zipcar.83 Zipcar employs RFID technology and a
wireless network for verification of users. 84 Before issuing an RFID
card to a user, Zipcar verifies the user's driving record.85 Zipcar takes
the chance that the eventual driver will not be the person who signed
up for the smart card. This chance at deception versus the cost of a
more comprehensive authentication appears to be an appropriate
level of risk for the company. Although, risk taking similar to this
would not be as pervasive in a STI verification system because of the
ability to include personal pictures and biometric information on the
result screen, risks would still exist.
Based on this risk analysis one can decide what level of security is
necessary and for what cost. Sites like safesexpassport.com are not
widely used because they charge up to $300 for use of the system for
just 6 months.86 This is problematic because as much as the most
technologically advanced system would be preferred for all; STIs
primarily affect poor, closeted, and otherwise hard to reach
communities. 87 Therefore, a tiered approach to verification levels
would be the best way to protect the largest swath of people. At the
most stringent level, the user would have to go through a complete
identity verification process with many details, which may be similar
to the process of obtaining a passport. A lesser level of verification
could require encrypted information that could only be unlocked with
a secret pin or fingerprint for someone who wants to retain anonymity
at a bathhouse or similar venue. It would be necessary to inform
people how different levels of verification affect the reliability of the
verification.
Lesser levels of verification may be an acceptable risk, because
even if someone has HIV, that person's ability to transmit the virus
83 Zipcar is a service where a person can reserve and rent a car on an hourly basis from
dispersed locations across a city that can be unlocked with only a smart card. See Zipcar,
How It Works, http://www.zipcar.com/how (last visited April 8, 2010).
84 Mary K. Pratt, RFID: A Ticket to Ride, Dec. 18, 2006,
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId
=269126&lntsrc=hmlist.
85 Id.
86 SSP Bioanalytics, Fort Lauderdale Company to Launch "Safe Sex Passport," Nov. 28,
2007, available at http://miamiherald.typepad.com/gaysouthflorida/2007/1/page/2.
87 Sunil Nair, The Effect Race and Income on HIVAIDS infection in African Americans,
Dec.12, 2007, http://www.slideshare.net/snair/the-effect-race-and-income-on-hivaids-
infection-in-africanamericans-presentation.
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depends on an individual's viral load and the type of sex that occurs.8 8
Specifically, the rate of transmission of HIV can range from about a 1
in 700 to a 1 in 3,000 chance of a man contracting the virus through
heterosexual sex with an HIV-positive female,8 9 to about a 1 in 10
chance for a receptive partner of anal sex.90 Therefore, even if an
individual commits fraud within the system, it may be an acceptable
risk because transmitting the virus to their partner is not a certainty,
even if an individual is HIV-positive.
The risks for fraud over no check at all may also be acceptable
because HIV is a disease that when treated properly merely decreases
life expectancy and quality of life, but does not normally cause an
individual to die immediately. By letting users choose the level of risk
they find acceptable from mere smartcards to full identification and
verification, they will have more responsibility for their choices and
can better protect themselves based on what they are willing to share.
No matter what technology is available, some people are not death
averse and they will continue to have anonymous unprotected sex.91
This technology will not eliminate HIV transmission but can simply
help insulate those people who want to have an extremely active sex
life and confidence in the reliability of a partner's HIV status while
minimizing their risks from those who are not death averse.
Other than fraud, individuals who lack traditional forms of
identification also present the problem of linking individuals to their
results, especially because those who lack traditional identification are
in high-risk populations. For instance, since teenagers do not get
licenses until around the age of 16, this would do nothing to help those
people who are engaging in unsafe sex before the age of 16.92 This is
important because the average age of first sexual experience in
88 Myron S. Cohen, HIVprevention: Rethinking the risk of transmission, 8 IAVI REPORT,
1-4 (Sep. 2004-Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.iavireport.org/archives/2004/Pages/IAVI-Report-8(3)-HIV-prevention.aspx.
89!d.
90 Id.
9, Tim Rhodes & Linda Cusick, Accounting for unprotected sex: stories of agency and
acceptability, 55 SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE 211, 224-225 (2002).
92 Peter P. Swire & Cassandra Q. Butts, The ID Divide: Addressing the Challenges of
Identification and Authentication in American Society, 12 (June 2oo8), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2oo8/o6/pdf/id divide.pdf.
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America is 16.9,93 and as many as one-third of teenagers are having
sex before age 16.94
This is also important because most, if not all, of the mainline
dating websites do not allow users under 18 for legal reasons. In many
places, it is illegal to have sex with those under 18,95 even though most
dating websites do not verify that their users are actually 18 years old
or older. Acknowledging that this occurs frequently and trying to help
those teenagers act safely would be a hard task to confront legally.96
This requires society to reevaluate whether laws should change to
acknowledge the fact that people under the age of 18 engage in sexual
activity and need protection from STIs.
The system may have the perverse impact of actually endangering
those under 18 more as they will not have results in the system. Thus,
when looking for their first sexual encounter, under-age individuals
may have to go to those people who do not care as much about STI
status. The effect of foreclosing those most concerned about STIs
from this population may put many more underage people at risk.
However, creating a separate system for those under 18, accessible
with parental consent, may help teach young adults to be concerned
with sexual health from an earlier age and give them a more tangible
tool to protect themselves than the meager sex education provided in
schools today.
The economically disadvantaged, who are in higher risk categories
for HIV, are also less likely to have a driver's license.97 This means
that a system reliant on photo identification will eliminate a
significant population of users, who need the system most. Having a
separate implementation that could be available to at risk
communities at low or no cost would be preferable, even if these
systems would not provide as much certainty as official government
ID.
93 Kinsey Institute, Frequently Asked Questions to the Kinsey Institute, Feb. 29, 2008,
http://www.kinseyinstitute.org/resources/FAQ.html#Age.
94 Elizabeth Cooksey, Researchers Link Teen Sex to Early Friendships, Steady Dating,
Nov. 12, 2002, http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/yungluv.htm.
95 Sandra Norman Eady, Statutory Rape Laws By State from the State of Connecticut,
April 14, 2003, http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/jud/rpt/2003-R-0376.htm.
96 Id.
97 Swire, supra note 92, at 13.
586 [Vol. 5:3
HELM5NK
B. VERIFICATION AND PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
One of the paramount considerations of any identification system
is protecting privacy and providing accessible, but secure verification.
The system must create confidence that the results entered into the
database will only be shared with those who the user chooses and will
allow the user to remove their information at any time. The users
must have near certainty that the results they share will be safe from
replication without their consent. While sharing status presents
certain risks, it is a risk that those who share their status take today,
and it is a risk that individuals must be willing to take in order for the
STI verification system to work. Lack of confidence in the security
and privacy of the STI verification system would quickly undermine
its usefulness because improper or inadvertent disclosure could cause
the individual to lose a job, lose insurance benefits, or cause mental
distress.98 To address similar concerns, some credit card companies
offer one-time only credit card numbers for online purchases;99 this
would be similar to the one-time only smart cards as previously
suggested.
Database integrity, accuracy, and safety is also very important
because no matter how good the system is, if a user can break into the
central repository of the database, then the entire system will fail.
However, due to the complexity of database integrity it is beyond the
scope of this article to discuss database security issues.1° °
98 See Lambda Legal, Fight HIVDiscrimination in the Foreign Service,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/take-action/campaigns/foreign-service/ (last visited April 8,
2010); Scott Stiffler, Despite Laws, HIV Discrimination Continues in Workplace, Feb 1,
2009,
http://www.edgeboston.com/index.php?ch=news&sc=&sc2=news&sc3=&id=86644.
99 Ina Steiner, One Time Use Credit Cards Offer Safer Online Shopping, Feb. 20, 2005,
http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/abu/y2o5/mo2/abuo137/so2.
1o0 See Aaron Newman, Database Security Best Practices, Aug. 1, 2005,
http://www.securitymagazine.com/Articles/Feature Article/5cc37c5da74d8oloVgnVCM1
ooooof932a8co .See also University of California at Berkeley, Database Guidelines
for Restricted Data, Feb. 3, 2006,
https://security.berkeley.edu/DbaseGdlnsRestData.html.
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C. ACCURACY AND EDUCATION
Each testing site and database would also need a system to check
the results for accuracy and quickly correct errors.'0' The accuracy
check would allow for the quick repair of false HIV positives and
negatives without imposing undue burden on those injured by the
errors. The process should be simpler than correcting incorrect data
on one's credit report. 10 2 A simple process for a more advanced retest
and correction of the result after that test would be sufficient in most
cases.
Next, the database or system must provide a guarantee to the user
that the test site administrator, who vouches for the accuracy of the
test results, issues the tests according to directions, and correctly
matches the results to the proper person. Otherwise, those who lead
risky sex lives would search out and exploit a test site that is more
prone to human error or cheating. A solution to error and cheating
problems could include mystery testers, inspectors who verify proper
protocol, or even an EBay type rating system for test accuracy. EBay's
system, gives a seller a bad rating if the product they ship is not as
they described.°3 Similarly, verification could occur by giving a lower
rating to a test site if someone tests negative but then subsequently
tests HIV-positive, and the confirmatory test shows that the virus was
likely testable and existent at the time of the last test. In this way, the
system could warn a potential partner that an individual's last test
may not be reliable as one from another testing center.
The need for this system may change in the future, because rapid
home HIV tests lack FDA approval and currently FDA-approved
clinics perform all HIV testing.'O4 FDA-approved rapid home tests
would make this HIV verification system less necessary because
results would come directly from the test itself. However, a system
involving FDA approved clinics may still have a higher accuracy
10, Swire, supra note 92, at 3.
102 Andrew Chan, How to Correct Your Credit Report, Jan. 23, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/managingyourmoney/archives/2009/
ol/correcting-your.html.
103 eBay, Feedback scores, Stars, and your Reputation,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/scores-reputation.html (last visited April 8, 2010).
104 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Vital Facts About HIVHome Test Kits, Jan. 29,
2008, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucmo48553.htm.
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because home testers are more likely to make an error, even though
studies show this risk to be minimal.'05
Another very important element in an effective STI verification
system is education about what the results mean. One critical piece of
education relates to the potential number of false HIV positives and
negatives.1° 6 The tests have up to a 99.8% accuracy rate when used
correctly.o7 However, several conditions like storage temperature and
shelf life can make the tests less accurate. 1° 8 In order to give accurate
tests, the FDA requires a Quality Assurance Program before offering
HIV tests.10 9 Even with this program, there are still a number of false
HIV positives, and while they may be within the guidelines on the
label, 30 out of 9,000 false HIV positive results are still significant. ' °
This also means that when considering the cost of administering more
rapid tests, one also needs to consider the cost of more confirmatory
tests at about $40 each"' that were not necessary before.112
When dealing with health information, false HIV positives and
negatives each carry a set of risks. False HIV positives can cause a lot
105 Sheldon Campbell & Roger Klein, Home Testing to Detect Human Immunodeficiency
Virus: Boon or Bane? 44 J. CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY, 3473-3476 (Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC15948o4/.
106 Peter Swire, supra note 92, at 2.
107 Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report, Jan. 13, 2006,
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?DR_ID=34775.
1o8 New York State Department of Health, Rapid HIV Testing Workbook and
Implementation Guidelines for Limited Testing Facilities in New York State,
http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/aids/testing/rapid/workbook.htm (last visited
April 8, 2010).
lo9 Jeffrey Greenwald, A Rapid Review of Rapid HIVAntibody Tests, 8 CURRENT
INFECTIOUS DISEASE REPORTS 125, 129 (2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/testing/resources/journal-article/pdf/rapid-review.pdf.
110 Reuters, Clinics Using OraQuick Oral HIV Test Reporting Rates of False-Positive
Results Within Limits on Label, OraSure Announces, Oct. 22, 2005,
http://www.thebody.com/content/art9362.html.
111 Abigail Zuger, Making HIV Testing Cost-Effective, HIV/AIDS CLINICAL CARE (Dec. 11,
2oo6), available at http://aids-clinical-care.jwatch.org/cgi/content/full/20o6/1211/1.
112 Reuters, Rapid HIV Test Has High False-Positive Rate, Aug. 19, 2008,
http://www.hivplusmag.com/NewsStory.asp?ID=18573&sd=o8/19/2oo8.
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of mental anguish, including increased suicide risk.113 There is also
the risk of reputational harm and its consequences from a partner who
learned these results from that partner sharing the HIV status
information in a malicious way.'14 Users must be educated to
understand that they may still have or contracted HIV even if they
have an initial negative test, because they might engage in even riskier
practices under the auspices of a false negative than they would in the
absence of such results, thereby making people vulnerable to HIV
transmission.",5
Another important aspect of education concerns what it means to
be HIV positive. Some research shows that a lower viral load may
result in a lowered risk of transmission to others."16 Some Swiss
experts even have a study that shows with proper anfiretroviral
therapy, an undetectable viral load for several months, and without
other STIs, HIV positive individuals may not be able to infect
anyone. 17 In this way, the spread of a system that also included
accurate information about a HIV positive person's viral load over
several months may be a very effective way to encourage those who
are positive to follow their treatment closely, which may also greatly
reduce the risk of transmission.
The goal of this system should not be to label people as positive or
negative and then segregate them. Instead, this tool can better
educate everyone as to the real risks of transmission, and make sure
everyone is tested and receives the medications they need in order to
reduce their risk of transmission to others.
113 Faxed False Positive HIV Test Results Leads to Statutory Mental Anguish Claim in
Florida, Aug. 19, 2004,
http://www.hollandharthealtheare.com/healtheare/2oo4/o8/faxed false-pos-l.html;
Abril v. Department of Corrections, 884 So.2d 206 (FlaApp. 2Dist., 2004).
114 Id.
115 J.P. Dodds et al., Increasing Risk Behaviour and High Levels of Undiagnosed HIV
Infection in a Community Sample of Homosexual Men. 8o SEXUALLY TRANSMITED
INFECTIONS, 236-40 (June 2004).
116 Joseph J. Eron, Jr., HIV Transmission: The Roles of Viral Load, Oral Sex, and STD's,
Feb. 1, 2000, http://cme.medscape.com/viewarticle/42o64o.
117 Edwin J. Bernard, Swiss Experts Say Individuals with Undetectable Viral Load and No
STI Cannot Transmit HIV During Sex, Jan. 30, 2oo8,
http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/4E9D555B-8FB-4D56-B912-2C28AFCCD36B.asp.
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D. TIMELINESS AND EASE
Another key element is timeliness. The more time between a test
and a sexual encounter means the more time for more partners since
that last test. In order to reduce that gap, tests need a reasonable
price, so that people can have them more frequently. By delivering
results to the individual, this system will also reduce the problem of
people who will not wait or return for their results.118 Impatience
within the younger generation necessitates a new system that shortens
the length of time a test takes, because a twenty-minute rapid test can
currently take an hour and a half to two and a half hours, depending
on counseling and various administrative tasks.119 This new HIV
verification system would instead deliver the information in a much
more expedient and user-friendly way, without a return to the testing
site or lengthy waiting time at the facility.
This would also create a system with more ease for those who want
more privacy. For example, the gay community supports a large
number of HIV testing clinics, which may make it an awkward place to
go for an individual who does not want others to believe he has sex
with other men. By increasing the amount of HIV tests being
performed a year, it would become more cost-efficient to disperse the
HIV testing sites to many more local community clinics which could
increase the comfort level for certain individuals to get tested. While
these additional clinics could exist today, without the STI verification
system, there is not a reason to test more often. First, many partners
will not ask about another's results. Second, individuals cannot verify
the results of their test. This cycle of confusion, however, may change
with a widely used STI verification system.
By increasing the availability, ease, and reliability of this testing, a
new STI verification system could change the social acceptability and
fear of being tested.120 An increased social reliance on this system
might also encourage more people to share their results by providing
118 Jeffrey L. Greenwald, et al., A Rapid Review of Rapid HIVAntibody Tests,
8 CURRENT INFECrIOUS DISEASE REP. 125,129 (2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/testinng/resources/Journal-article/pdf/rapid-review.pdf.
119 Centers for Disease Control, Counselor Perceptions and Impression of HIV Counseling
Using a Rapid HIV Test Respect- 2, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/research/respect-
2/bibliography/ppt/Counslmpressions.ppt (last visited April 8, 2010).
120 10 Reasons to Test for STIs, POSITIvELIFENSW,2oo6,
http://positivelife.org.au/factsheet/15.
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social incentives for being tested.121 Increased levels of testing can
reduce the level of new STI cases, because many STIs with proper
treatment have a reduced risk of transmission to others.122 Sharing
these results might even lead to less drug use and depression as real
numbers of those infected become more apparent, and infected people
can better understand that they are not alone.123 Providing better
accessibility to STI information will increase awareness of the
prevalence of these issues, and might help change the minds of those
who have moral reservations about safe sex education.124
VI. WHO WOULD BEAR THE TORT LIABILITY?
A. PERSONAL LIABILITY
There are several torts available for those who contract STIs.
These are negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and battery.125 Thirty-two states
make knowing HIV transmission a crime.126 In fact, transmission of a
sexual disease is a felony in Oklahoma.127 Courts today tend to make
case-specific analyses into whether a duty of care exists to inform a
sexual partner of one's status.128
12, Howard E. Gendelman et al., The Neurology of AIDS, 759 (2d ed. 2005), available at
http://books.google.com (search "Search Books" for "The Neurology of Aids;" then follow
"The neurology of AIDS" hyperlink).
122 Derek Thaczuk & Michael Carter, Antiretroviral Treatment Lowers Rates of HI V
Transmission in Heterosexual Couples in Africa, Feb. 10, 2009,
http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/EE59Ao7-93DF-4B9B-AE5E-5E86DFol8B41.asp.
123 Richard Knox, Many Americans With HJV Don't Know They Have It, Nov. 24, 20o8,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97315837.
124Id.
125 Legal Match, Liability for Transmitting a Sexually Transmitted Disease,
http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/liability-for-transmitting-a-sexually-
transmitted-disease.html (last visited March 12, 2010).
126 American Civil Liberties Union, Criminal Statutes on HIV Transmission, June 4, 2008,
http://www.aclu.org/files/images/assetupload-file292-35655.pdf.
127 Deana Pollard-Sacks, Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REV. 769, 808 (2007) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=783464.
128 Id. at 796.
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An online site for verification of STIs could change the way these
laws work. If people refused to use the technology to verify a partner's
status, they might lose the right to sue. Such an approach could help
to prevent people who are HIV-positive from lawsuits even though the
other person assumed the risk. Knowledge of one's HIV status would
no longer subject a person to increased liability and this could make
people more willing to learn their own HIV status.
Currently, physicians also have an ethical obligation to inform
third parties when they are aware that an HIV-positive patient is
going to engage in sex with someone else and is planning not to
inform that other person.129 The system proposed above could reduce
some of the liability on physicians because the tools would be easy to
use and those who failed to use them would bear more responsibility
for their own health choices.
Some argue that transmission of sexual diseases should subject
the transmitter to strict liability.13°  Others agree with Deanna
Pollard's statement that, "[i]n the sexual disease context, the parties
are often unable to negotiate fairly over who should bear the risk of
loss, because they lack information. In a sense, an information defect
is present when neither party is aware of the disease."13' Closing the
information gap, by encouraging more frequent testing and checking,
is exactly the goal of this system. In this way, there will not be a need
for new sexual strict liability torts because those who do not
participate in the system will be assuming their own risks, which
would exclude them from recovery because they made a reckless
decision. In today's system, with incomplete information, it does not
seem fair to implement a system of sexual strict liability torts, when
even getting a rapid test can become a tedious multi-hour process.' 32
B. SYSTEM LIABILITY
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA") provides regulations on privacy that could make it
complicated to implement this system because of its restrictions on
129 Thomas Bradley et al., Legal Issues Associated With Disclosure of Patient's HIV
Positive Status to Third Parties, American Academy of HIV Medicine (Summer 2002),
http://www.thebody.com/content/art33211.html.
130 Pollard-Sacks, supra note 127, at 770.
131 Id. at 808.
132 Swire, supra note 92.
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sharing personally identifiable health information133 The first step in
determining HIPAA coverage is to determine if the STI verification
system would qualify as one of the covered entities of: health care
provider, health care clearinghouse, or health plan.134 The HIV testing
center would likely be a provider and the verification system might be
a clearinghouse.135 However, pursuant to HIPAA, if a testee were to
give written authorization for sharing of their results, the registry
would be able to release the results legally to the system, which in turn
could release it to their chosen partners.136
There would be massive potential liability if the consent was out of
date or if the privacy terms of the website changed without the express
informed consent of the users. HIPAA violations can range from $1oo
per violation with an annual maximum of $25,000 for violations
where an individual reasonably did not know they were violating
HIPAA to $50,000 per violation with an annual maximum of
$1.5million for violations with more neglect.137 In order to prevent
potential liability, the consent forms would need to be very detailed
but easy to understand regarding who might see this information, so
that there are no surprises. This could be difficult to implement and
may be part of the reason why some of the existing sites merely
removed the profiles of HIV positive members instead of dealing with
the consent issues of sharing that status. As guidance, a list of
standards, like the list for Public Health Departments when dealing
133 University of Miami, Privacy/Data Protection Project, Consent (HIPPA),
http://privacy.med.miami.edu/glossary/xd-consent.htm (last visited April 8, 2010).
134 Covered Entity Charts, 2,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HIPAAGenInfo/Downloads/CoveredEntitycharts.pdf (last
visited April 8, 2010).
135 See A Resource Guide for HIV Services Providers and Health Resources and Services
Administrations HIV/AIDS Bureau Staff, April 2004,
http://hab.hrsa.gov/publications/hippao4.htm.
136 Columbia University Medical Center, Uses and Disclosures of HIV/AIDS Information,
http://www.cumc.columbia.edu/hipaa/policies/hiv.html (last visited April 8, 2010).
137 American Medical Association, HIPAA Violations and Enforcement, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-
insurance/hipaaheath-insurane-prtabiity-accountability-act/hipaa-violations-
enforcement.shtml (last visited April 8, 2010).
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with STI prevention on the Internet,138 could exist for STI verification
sites to help avoid liability.
It is also possible that this service will not fall under HIPAA,
depending on its exact design, because HIPAA applies differently
depending on how information is stored. For instance, HIPPA does
not apply to Google Health because it does not store the data on behalf
of the health care providers, but instead merely stores the records for
the users who have a right to request the information.139 Much like
Google Health, the system could reduce some of its potential liability
by having a person release their results to it.
In 2009, as part of the America Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, the list of organizations covered by HIPAA expanded.140 Google
and Microsoft maintain that this still does not apply to them because
they interact directly with the consumer and are not a business
associate of the hospital.141 The issue seems to turn on whether the
services add value for the consumers or for the health care providers
themselves.142 The ability of Google Health to avoid HIPAA coverage
at this point is instructive because the information stored in the STI
identification system would only be one result or one set of results, not
someone's entire medical record. In this way, this system actually
raises fewer privacy concerns than Google Health does. Even with the
reduced privacy concerns, this STI identification system should have
stricter privacy requirements than those required under HIPAA in
order to encourage widespread use of the system.
One major obstacle to participation in this system would be that
currently 43 states require that testing centers report HIV results to
138 National Coalition of STD Directors, National Guidelines for Internet-Based STD and
HlVPrevention: Accessing the Power of the Internet for Public Health (March 2008),
available at http://www.ncsddc.org/upload/wysiwyg/documents/IG-FINAL.pdf.
139 Google, Google Health and HIPAA, http://www.google.com/intl/en-
US/health/hipaa.html (last visited April 8, 2010).
140 Neil Versel, HIPPA Expands to Personal Health Records - Just Not Google's or
Microsoft's, If You Ask Them, April 7, 2009,
http://industry.bnet.com/healthcare/100048o/is-google-above-the-law.
141 Vince Kuraifis, Privacy Law Showdown? Legal and Policy Analysis, April 21, 2009,
http ://e-caremanagement.com/privacy-law-showdown-legal-and-policy-analysis.
142 Id.
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state health authorities.143 This rule needs altered for the most
effective use of this system, because while sharing results with a
sexual partner is one issue, giving them to the government is a greater
concern. State governments do not always follow proper privacy
procedures 44 and malicious sharing of HIV data is very possible. This
lack of trust in what the government may do with the information may
keep those who do not want the government involved in their life from
participating in a STI verification system.
Leaked information and information shared without the owner's
consent is another area for potential liability. Several lawsuits are
currently active against sites who have leaked nude photos of their
members.145 Moreover, the Wisconsin Bar Association advises that
telling other people another person's results without that person's
consent may be cause for a lawsuit.4 6 This is why the system must
have safeguards to verify that users are intending to share the
information at a given time, and limit the amount of access to results
without verification from the user, within that given time.
Another area of potential liability is suing these existing sex sites
for negligence over the spread of STIs much in the same way that
some try to sue cigarette companies over the health risks associated
with smoking. 147 Negligence requires a duty of care, breach of that
duty, causation, and harm.148 The adult entertainment industry in an
effort to reduce its liability from this sort of liability and in an effort to
reduce their performers from contracting STIs has guidelines that
require valid STI tests. Specifically, the adult entertainment industry
143 Hilary Oswald, New Federal HIV Testing Protocols Unveiled, Nov. 1, 2006,
http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results/19981/New-Federal-HIVTesting-Protocol
s_Unveiled.html.
144 Associated Press, Strickland: Data on Stolen Device are Needed, YOUNGSTOWN
VINDICATOR, June 17, 2007, available at
http://www4.vindy.com/content/national-world/322335758371957.php.
145 Bil Browning, PR lOl: Dustin Lance Black Lawsuit Over Leaked Sex Pies, HUFFINGTON
POST, Aug. 5, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bil-browning/pr-lol-dustin-lance-
black b_2522o8.html.
146 State Bar of Wisconsin, HJV and Your Rights: A Legal Guide to Wisconsin,
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=47422&TEMPL
ATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited April 8, 2010).
147 Matt Smith, Cruise Control, SF Weekly, April 8, 2008, available at
http://www.sfweekly.com/2oo8-o4-o9/news/cruise-control.
148 Negligence, http://www.answers.com/topic/negligence (last visited April 8, 2010).
[Vol. 5:3
HELMIK
requires that the Adult Industry Medical Healthcare Foundation does
the testing and that the tests originate from within the past month. 149
The PCR DNA test they use, that tests for the virus itself instead of for
the antibodies like a standard HIV test,150 can identify a positive result
as early as 9 days after exposure.151 By requiring use of these
advanced tests, adult entertainment studios limit their liability for
breach of duty of care much in the same way adult hookup websites
could limit their liability by using a STI verification system like the
one suggested. Conversely, any site that would also encourage
unprotected sex based on the reliability of the system may expose
itself to liability for overstating the effectiveness of its tests and
become the legal cause for the transmission of the STI.
There may also be potential legal liability if a batch of rapid at
home tests failed. With this system, in-person, trained, testing means
easier reinforcement of the importance of these risks and education
about the accuracy of the tests, even if only in minimal ways. This
education would help reduce court cases for negligence for failing to
meet the duty of care as the testing sites, working in conjunction with
the website, could utilize multiple paths of education to prove that
they did not breach the duty of care to provide complete information
about test accuracy to their users.
Legal problems could be worse for this system than just having
rapid at home tests because states may try to sue for access to the
records in order to prosecute crimes involving STI transmission under
the statutes described earlier in this article. For instance, the state of
California subpoenaed the records of the Adult Industry Medical
Healthcare Foundation.52 Michigan, in the recent past, even released
the HIV-positive status of an arrested man without his consent. 5 3
149 Matt Siegel, Business Before Pleasure?, The Advocate, Aug. 16, 20o9, available at
http://www.advocate.com/printArticle.aspx?id=95221.
150 Adult Industry Medical Healthcare Foundation, HIV/AIDS, October 6, 2007,
http://www.aim-med.org/library/articles/1194375471/
151 Id.
152 Jason Schossler, Porn Star Says State Violated Her Privacy Over HIV Test Results,
Aug. 12, 2009,
http://news.findlaw.com/andrews/h/hea/2oo9o8o7/2oo9o8o7_patientzero.html.
153 Todd A. Heywood, Attorney General's Ruling on HIV Disclosure Prompts Medical
Privacy Worries, Sep. 9, 20o9, http://michiganmessenger.com/25797/attorney-generals-
ruling-on-hiv-disclosure-case-prompts-medical-privacy-worries.
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Several states are also using GPS to track sex offenders,154 and
California recently joined other states by moving to an HIV tracking
system that tracks people by name instead of alphanumeric codes.55
Based on these examples, fear of states misusing this data is justified.
This potential for misuse requires stronger state privacy statutes to
protect those who wish to disclose their STI results with others, but do
not want the state to receive the data. This may mean that the most
effective use of this technology would be for single use HIV test
results, where the results are stored only for the night and then
deleted from the system so that the government or other malicious
parties can never access the data.
VII. INVESTING IN THIS SYSTEM MAKES FINANCIAL SENSE
An STI verification system provides tangible social and economic
benefits, because of the costs associated with HIV. Studies show that
approximately 20% of those infected with HIV between the ages of 25-
64 do not have any health insurance.15 6 This is extremely costly for
states, as Ohio has shown by spending in a single year: $1.6 million
for HIV medications in prisons; $14.6 million for social services to the
infected poor; and $42.5 million to pay for HIV drugs and treatment,
home health care, and nursing home beds.157 While the technological
solutions suggested by this article may be politically controversial, due
to the extraordinary costs of HIV treatment, they make economic
sense.
Even for those who can pay, treatment for an HIV positive person
averages $25,200 a year.158  During the average 24-year life
expectancy of an HIV positive person, treatment can equal over
154 Hannah Sentenac, More States Move to Use GPS Tracking of Sex Offenders, May 31,
2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/o,2933,196455,oo.html.
'55 Charles Ornstein, Assembly Agrees to Update HIV Tracking, LA TIMES, March 31,
2006, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2oo6/mar/31/local/me-hiv3l.
156 Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance, Care Without Coverage, 164, (2002),
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=10367&page=164.
157 Margaret Newkirk & David Knox, Prison's Hidden Cost, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Mar.
17, 2002, available at
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/AkronBeaconJournalo3172002.shtml.
158 Associated Press, AIDS Patients Will Spend $6ook for Care, Nov. 10, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15655257/.
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$600,ooo.159 Yet, a rapid test averages only about $7, and a more
extensive confirmatory test only averages about $40.160 The accuracy
for these tests if the virus is present is greater than 99.5%.161
However, a window of three weeks to three months exists before the
test can detect the antibodies in the blood if someone is newly
infected.162 Even with this downside, the cost of just one person's
treatment for a year could test 30 individuals in the highest risk
categories every month for 1o years. With an HIV verification and
identification system, the reduction in the amount of infected
individuals and consequent savings would easily make the system pay
for itself.
Although the cost savings associated with lowered transmission
rates would be great, PKI is still expensive and may be more expensive
than the testing itself. Traditional in-house and outsourced PKI
systems can cost between $81 and $420 per user, per year based on a
system with 1,000 users.163 A new method of PKI, called Server Side
Signing, uses existing user information and can reduce costs but
would have an initial high cost for setup around $90 a user, but would
then decrease to $15 a user in subsequent years based on a system
with 1,000 users.164 The costs for both types of PKI go down as more
users join the system; for instance, the $81 cost per user at 1,000
users can drop to $33 with 10,000 users,16 5 at 50,000 users the cost
159 Id.
16o Abigail Zuger, Making HIV Testing Cost- Effective, HIV/AIDS Clinical Care, Dec. 11,
2006, available at http://aids-clinical-care.jwatch.org/cgi/content/full/2oo6/1211/1.
161 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, FDA-Approved Rapid HIVAntibody
Screening Tests, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/testing/rapid/rt-
comparison.htm.
162 New York State Health Department, FAQ's Concerning Rapid Testing for HIV,
http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/aids/testing/rapid/faqs.htm (last visited March
12, 2010).
163 Cosign, Digital Signatures and the Hidden Costs of PKI, Nov. 20o8, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/9768o12/Digital-Signatures-and-the-Hidden-Costs-of-PKI;
Verisign, TCO for PKI Whitepaper, Feb. 2002; Entrust, Why Outsourcing Your PKI
Provides the Best Value, July 2009, available at
http://download.entrust.com/resources/download.cfm/23826/Entrust-Managed-
Services-PKI TCO.pdf/?start.
164 Id.
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could drop to under $10 per user.166 As the system grows, adding a
user to the system could cost roughly as much as a rapid test costs per
user. For less than the cost of one year of HIV medications for
prisoners in Ohio, the PKI infrastructure for this system could be set
up in all of the highest risk communities in several states, if not
nationwide, depending on the method chosen.
By increasing the quantity of rapid HIV tests, and creating a space
to share the results, economies of scale and competition would be sure
to drive down the price even further. The accuracy and speed of these
tests alone is already starting a trend of shortening the window
between tests in Seattle, San Francisco, Denver, and the District of
Columbia.167 In those cities, the average interval between HIV tests
has dropped to under 300 days for men who have sex with men.168
This system could drop this interval further and could transform the
spread of HIV in America, by marginalizing those who refuse to use
the system, and creating stronger communities for those who have
HIV.169
VIII. CONCLUSION
The resurgence of STIs, especially HIV, threatens to cost billions
of dollars and adversely affect millions without new approaches. Not
everyone will participate in a STI verification system, and
vulnerabilities would still exist for fraud and misuse. However,
today's process of trusting someone's representation of their STI
status is unreliable and individuals consistently make sexual decisions
based on inadequate information.
Tools are already available to create a system that can better
protect individuals and raise the visibility level of STIs. It is
irresponsible not to use these technologies more widely. Once a
166 Entrust, supra note 163.
167 Donna Helms et al., HIV Testing FrequencyAmong Men Who Have Sex with Men
Attending Sexually Transmitted Disease Clinics is Declining, 50 JOURNAL OF ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES, 320, 320-26 (March 2009), available at
http://journals.lww.com/jaids/AbstraCt/2oo9/o3olo/HIVTesting-Frequency-Among-
MenWhoHaveSexWith.12.aspx.
168 Id.
169 J. Grierson, Memberships and Alliances: The Importance of Community
Identifications for Health Maintenance in a HIV Positive Cohort in NSW, Dec 9-11, 1999,
http://gateway.nlm.nih.gov/MeetingAbstracts/ma?f=1o2242873.html.
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system with sufficient privacy is operational and reliable, the
legislature should require that different hookup and relationship
websites, and sex clubs, use this system. This new testing system even
has the potential to change the handling of sexual torts. Instead of
liability resting on doctors or those who knowingly infect others, it
shifts the responsibility to those who are irresponsible in their
avoidance of STIs.
It is uncertain if this system will reduce overall STI transmission
through knowledge and higher rates of adherence to HIV medication
regimens, or increase it, because people will be more reckless.
However, to not attempt to allow people to make decisions about their
own sex life with as much information as possible is a reckless choice
that should end soon. The emergence of a system like this may not
solve the epidemic, but it is a cost effective way for those who are
concerned about their health, to obtain more sanity in the emerging
world of Internet dating where it is just not possible to know how
much to trust your next sexual partner with your health.
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